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In the Supreme Court of
The State of Utah'
GENERAL TALKING PICTURES CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

l

NAIDA L. HYATT, as Executrix of the
Estate of E. H. Littlejohn, who is the same [
person as Elsie Haas Littlejohn, who is the
same perS'~n as Elsie H. Littlejohn, and I
JAMES COCHRAN LITTLEJOHN, as administrator with will annexed of the Estate
of William Littlejohn, deceased,
Defendants.

CIVIL
No. 7170

j

Appellant's Brief
This is an appeal by the plaintiff upon the Judgment
Roll from a judgm~nt entered by the District Court of Carbon County in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff, no cause of action~
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of D·eleware with its office and
principal place of business in New York City. (J.R. p 43).
The defendant Naida L. Hyatt is the executrix of the estate
of E. H. Littlejohn who died on or about May 8, 1942; and
the defendant James Cochran Littlejohn is the administraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tor with will annexed of the estate of William Littlejohn
who died on or about June 14, 1944. (J.R. p 44).
The action is upon a claim which is alleged by plaintiff
to have been "duly presented" to the defendants in their
representative capacities (J.R. p 2) which claim is based
upon a written contract dated November 19, 1931, a copy
of which contract is attached to the complaint, whereby
the plaintiff leased to the decedents for a term of ten years
from the date of the contract, certain patented talkingpicture apparatus designated in the contract as the "Equipment", for use. only in the Lyric Theatre in Price, Utah, for
the sum of $2,000.00 payable in installments of $500.00
each, the last of which_ was due 60 days after the installation of the equipment in the theatre. In addition, the decedents were to pay, during the term of the contract, annual
license fees of $50 commencing with the year 1932. (J.R.
p 4).

The equipment was installed (J.~. p 44) and the $2,000.00 was paid, (J.R. p 25) but none of the $50 annual fees
was paid. (J.R. p 45). The court found that the plaintiff
had performed all the obligations and conditions imposed
upon it by the agreement. (J.R. p 45).
The contract was _found to have been executed by de-:fendants' testators (J.R. p 44), and it provides that "upon
the expiration or sooner termination of this license for any
reason whatsoever OR (emphasis added) the abandonment
by the Exhibitor (decedents; J.R. pp 4, 45) of the Theatre
(Lyric The-atre, Price; Utah; J.R. p 4) or his eviction there··
from, the Exhibitor, at its own cost and expense, spall surrender and deliver up possession of the E·quipme.nt to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Company (Plaintiffs; J.R. p 4) at its factory ... " (J.R. pp
6, 45-46). The decedents, and after their deaths, the defendants, failed and neglected to return the equipment at
the expiration of the "license", or at all (J.R. p 45), and
the defendants are unable to return said equipment for the
reason that they have no knowledge ·Of its whereabouts
(J.R. p 45). Also, the decedents, and after their death, the
defendants, have failed to pay any of the said $50 annual
fees. (J.R. p 45).
Plaintiff sued to recover the value of the equipment
\Vhich the court found to be $3,000.00 at the commencement of the action (J.R. p 45), and to recover the total of
the annual license fees.· The action was commenced on May
24, 1945 and the case was tried to the court without a jury
on May 14, 1946 (J.R. p 50), and on October 27, 1947' the
court made and filed his Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (J.R. p 49) and entered judgment in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff (J.R. p 51). Motion for
new trial was duly filed (J .R. p 54) and, on December 8,
1947, the motion was denied and overruled (J.R. 55). This
appeal is upon the Judgment Roll.
The court found, inter alia, that plaintiff presented
its claim to the defendants in their respective capacities,
"but did not accompany or present with said claims, or
either of them, a copy of the written Agreement upon
which the same was and is found or based", and "that William Littlejohn and E. H. Littlejo~n abandoned and ceased
to operate the Lyric Theatre in the year 1937 (J.R. p 46).
Also, "that more than six years prior to the commencement of this action, the plaintiff elected to terminate and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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did · terminate said Agreement and more than six years
prior to the commencement of this action, repeatedly demanded a return of said Phorto!ilm and equipment by the
decedents; that nothwithstanding Sfiid termination and said
repeated demands, as aforesaid, said Phonofilm and equipment were never returned to the plaintiff." (J.R. p 46), and
concluded that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by
Sections 104-2-24 (2) and 104-2-22 (2) Utah Code Annotated,
and that plaintiff's "alleged claims" are legally insufficient
(~.R. p 48), adjudged that plaintiff recover nothing by its
complaint from the defendants, or either of them, and rendered judgment in .favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff, no cause of action.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The plaintiff contends that the court erred in:
(1) Finding that plaintiff's claims were presented to
the defendants without accompanying or presenting thereV'Tith copies of the written Agreement upon which the same
was and is founded or based.
(2) Finding that more than six years prior to the
commencement of the action plaintiff elected to terminate
and did ter~inate said Agreement.
1

(3) Concluding that plaintiff's cause or causes of
action are barred by the Statutes of Limitations.
(4) Concluding that the claims presented by plaintiff
were legally insufficient.
(5) Concluding that judgment should be for defendants no cause of a·ction and that plaintiff should take nothing by its complaint.
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( 6) Concluding that defendants should be awarded
their costs.
(7) Granting judgment in favor of defendants and
against the plaintiff no cause of action, and the plaintiff
recover nothing from defendants, or either of them.
(8) Granting judgment in favor of defendants for
their costs.

ARGUMENT
First Assignment of Error
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the trial court
erred in finding that plaintiff's claim as presented to the
defen~ants was not accompanied by a copy of the written
contr~ct upon which the claim was founded, or that such
copy was not presented with said claim. (Finding No. 14;
J. R. p 47). The plaintiff should be sustained in its contention because it alleged that the claim was duly presented
(J.R. p 2; Par. 12) and nowhere is that allegation denied.
On the contrary; the defendants admit in their amended answer to . Paragraph 12 of plaintiff's complaint "that the
plaintiff presented to each a purported claim in said
estates.' (J.R. p 24).
When plaintiff alleged that a claim was "duly presented" in each of said estates it; in effect, alleged that a
copy of the contract upon which the claim was based was
attached to the claim as presented. This is so bec~use the
word "duly" implies "the existence of every ~act essential
to perfect regularity of procedure." 19 Corpus Juris, page
833. Since a claim, based upon a written instrument, to
be regularly presented must be accompanied by a copy of
such instrument, it follows that a claim regularly presented
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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is one with which is also presented a copy of the written
instrument upon which it is founded.
As pointed out above the defendants not only did not
deny the proper, regular and "due" presentation of the
claim, they admitted that plaintiff duly presented a "purported" claim. A "purported" claim is a sufficient and statutory claim. State vs Burling (Iowa) 72 N W 205; Hollister v McCord et al (Wis) 87 N W 475; State vs W. S. Buck
Mere Co (Wyo) 264 P. 1023 @ 1030; Gilchrist's Case (Eng)
2 L,each 657 quoted in Words & Phrases Vol 35, Per Ed. p.
542; Merrifield v Robbins et al (Mass) 8 Grey 150; Brownlow v Wunsch (Colo) 83 P2nd 775, 781; Lacy v State (Okl)
242 P. 296; McCraney v Glos (Ill) 78 N E 921, 923 ; Deskin
v US Reserve Ins. Corp (Mo) 298 S W 103, 106; Regina v
Keith, Eng. Law & Equity 558, 560, quoted in Vol.35 Words
& Phrases Perm. Ed. p. 541. It is therefore .contended that
no issue was raised by the defendants' amended answer to
this allegation. The allegation being admitted, a finding
in conflict therewith is e_rroneous and must be disregard~d.
64 Corpus Juris, page 1259; Chase v. Van Camp Sea Food
Co., 292 Pac. 179; Gabriel v~ Tonner, 70 Pac. 1021; Murphy
v. Coppeiters, 68 Pac. 970; Dressler v. Johnston, 21 Pac.
(2d) 969; De Michele v. London and Lancaster Fire Ins.
Co., 40 U. 312, 120 Pac. 846; Peterson v. Bean, 22 U. 43, 61
Pac. 213.
It might have been otherwise had the defendants alleged in their amended answer wherein the claim was defective and not what it purported to be .. It is submitted
that this is an affirmative matter which defendants are
required to plead. By simply admitting that plaintiff duly
presented a purported claim defendants did not deny that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the claim was presented, or allege that it was rrot regular
or proper in form or was not what it purported to be.
Second Assignment of Error
It is also the contention of the plaintiff that the court
erred in finding "that more than six years prior to the
commencement of this action, the plaintiff elected to terminate and did terminate said Agreement * * *". (Finding
No. 12; J.R. p 46).
The court erred first because the purported finding is
not a finding of fact but a conclusion of law. For example,
assume that a litigant was seeking an adjudication that he
\vas no longer liable on a contract for the reason that the
adverse party had terminated it, and alleged simply that
the adverse party had terminated the contract, _without
alleging the acts or conduct which, in the opinion of the
pleader, effected such termination. This, certainly, would
have been bad as pleading a mere conclusion of law, and
would have raised no issue of fact.
The writer has not been able to find any case which
has adjudicated this question with respect to the word "termination" or "terminated", but there are numerous cases
and text books wherein words of the same character are
condemned as mere conclusions of law, for example, "repudiated"; "abandoned"; "surrendered"; "waived"; "rescinded"; "released" ; "forfeited." It is submitted that the
word "terminated" is one of the same character as those
quoted. Therefore. the authorities would apply the same.rule
to the word in question. 49 Corpus Juris 55, 58, 59; Pleading,
Sections 27 and 36; Dutch Flat Water Co. v. Mooney, 12
Cal. 534; Miller v. Modern Motor Co. of Glendale, 290 Pac.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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122; Adams v. Hine, 268 Pac. 217; Zorn v. Livesley, 75 Pac.
1057; Hanson v. Fidelity Mutual Benefit Corporation, 13
Atl. (2d) 456; King v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 57 N. Y. S.
(2d) 684. Therefore it follows that, even if defendants had
pleaded that plaintiff "elected to terminate, and did terminate said Agreement", such a plea would have been bad as
a mere conclusion of law. Because the court adopts a
"finding" of termination it does not change its character
from a conclusion to a ·fact.
Secondly, the "finding" is er:r:oneous for the reason
that it is outside the issues raised by the ple~dings. Surely
this' is an affirmative matter for the defendants to plead.
Plaintiff pleaded a contract for a term of ten years from
the dates of its execution. If the defend~nts claimed the
contract was terminated before the expiration of the tenyear period it was up to them to set forth the facts which
they claimed effected such termination. But one will look
in vain through the defendants' amended answer for even
the allegation of the legal conclusion of termination. Being
outside the issues raised by the pleadings the "finding"
must be disregarded by this court on appeal. 64 Corpus
Juris 1227, 1256-7; Kimball v. Success Mining Co., 38 Utah
78, 110 Pac. 872; Neuberger v. Robbins, 37 Utah 197, 106
Pac. 933; Cole v. Gill (Cal.) 144 Pac.(2d) 25. Also, "where
the pleading is silent regarding a material fact, the presumptions are against the pleader, and no intendment can
be made in his favor. Thus a material fact, if not alleged,
is presumed not to exist." 49 Corpus Juris 120.
'

i~

\

The case of Neuberg·er v. Robbins, supra, we believe,
determinative of the question. In that case the plaintiff
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sued to recover the balance claimed by him to be due on
the purchase price of 1,1421/2 bushels of wheat sold and 'delivered to defendant. Defendant answered that the plaintiff
had contracted to sell 3,000 bushels of wheat to him at 64c
per bushel; that to induce plaintiff to perform he had
consented to an increase in the price to 68c per bushel. The
delivery of the 1,142¥2 bushels was admitte-d, but defendant
alleged he had been damaged by the plaintif~'s failure to
perform in the sum of $278 and prayed judgment against
the plaintiff for that sum. Plaintiff replied that at the
time of modification of the contract it was agreed that he
_was to deliver only so much wheat as he had on hand 'at
the date of delivery. There was te'stimony on plaintiff's
behalf that the defendant, through hi~ agent, stated that
the quantity of wheat delivered made no difference, "just
so we get what you have to spare. That is all we look for."
The court made a finding to correspond to this testimony
that "the -plaintiff * * * agreed to sell and deliver to the
defendant so much of his said crop of wheat as he, the
said plaintiff, could spare" and gave· judgment for plaintiff.
In reversing the judgment the court say:
"In his counterclaim defendant pleaded and relied upon the contract as first entered into between
himself and plaintiff, which, he alleges, was modified so as to increase the price he was to pay for
the plaintiff's grain, but not otherwise. On the
other hand, plaintiff, in his reply to defendant's
counterclaim, alleged that 'an entirely new agreement' was entered into 'in which plaintiff onl~
agreed to sell the amount of wheat he actually
had on hand at the time.' It will thus be seen that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the pleadings presented the questiqn, namely, was
the contract modified as alleged by defendant, or
was a new contract entered into 'in which plaintiff
agreed to sell the amount of wheat he actually
had on hand at said time,' as pleaded by plaintiff?
Now, the court, instead of making a finding responsive to and within this issue, found that a
contract entirely different from either the contract
pleaded by plain tiff or that pleaded by defendant
had been entered in to by the parties. The finding being entirely outside of the issues is therefore erroneous and cannot be upheld." (Emphasis
added). So, even though there is evid~nce to support a finding, if such finding is outside the issues,
it is "erroneous and cannot be upheld."
Third, the court found that between the dates of November 23, 1932 and May 5, 1944, both dates inclusive,
plaintiff wrote numerous letters, 74 in all, to decedents in
each of which it demand~d payment of the $50 annual fees
then due, and in some of said letters, between the dates
of July 9, 1935 and March 1, 1943, both inclusive, plaintiff
''demanded the return to it by the decedents of said Phonofilm and equipment." (Finding No. 13, J.R. pp 46-47).
Unless these letters are calculated to have effected the
termina;tion of "said Agreement" the trial court has made
no conclusion respecting them.
The contract provides, as the trial court found, (J.R.
p 46), "that 'this license shall be- for a period of ten (10)
years' from its date but may be soone,r terminated by the
plaintiff upon the happening of certain events, one of which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is 'the failure or refusal for a period of three days to pay
any sum or sums of money now or hereafter due, by acceleration or otherwise to be paid by' the decedents 'and
in this respect time shall be of the essence.'" (E·mphasis
added). It must be noted that the plaintiff, alone, could
terminate the contract prior to November 19, 1941, and
then only upon the happening of certain events. The decedents were not granted any such right of election. The
only one of these events that has any connection with the
case or is material to its determination, is "the failure or
refusal for a period of three days to pay any sum or sums
of money now or hereafter due, by acceleration or otherwi~e." It must be borne in mind that such failure or refusal did not, ipso facto, terminate the agreement, but was
a ground upon which the plaintiff might have done so if
it saw fit. It must be borne in mind also that plaintiff was
not bound to terminate the agreement upon the happening
of any of the events.
The question which is then presented is, Did the demands for payment of the annua~ license fees and _for the
return of the equipment constitute an election to terminate, and a termination of, the Agreement? To ask the
question- is to answer it. Suppose decedents had executed
their promissory note payable to plaintiff in annual installments over a period of ten years, and the note provided, as is frequently the case, that upon default in the
payment of any installment the entire balance should become immediately due and payable at the election of the
holder; and that decedents defaulted after the first year
and made no further payments. Would it be contended
that, if plaintiff had demanded payment of the installment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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due the second year, and each year thereafter repeated
the demand for the total of the accrued installments, it
would be deemed to have elec,ted to declare the entire balance due and thereby started the statute of limitations
running against it? We think not. At no time before the
expiration of the ten-year period did plaintiff demand payment of more than was due under the agreement at the
time of demand. (J.lt p 47). Even if plaintiff had threatened ,to sue the decedents for their failure to make the
payments when due this would not have constituted an
election. 41 Corpus Juris 850, n 46 (b). Nowhere in the
agreement is there a provision that a demand for performance shall constitute an election to terminate, and that is
all plaintiff did by its letters. The letters of demand show
that plaintiff regarded the contract as still in force and
effect. "The primary object of a demand is to enable defendant to perform his obl,igation or otherwise discharge
his liability without being subjected to the ,inconvenience
and expense of litigation." 1 Corpus Juris 979. llow can
it be said, then, that a' demand is an election to cut off the
defendant's right or_ opportunity to perform and subject
him forthwith to litigation?
Fourth, as pointed out above, decedents had no right
to terminate, the agreement. That right was reserved to
'

the plaintiff in the event decedents defaulted in certain
particulars. (Agreement, Par. 14; J.R. p 5). The agree-

ment, also provides, as found by the court, that "upon the
expiration or ,sooner termination of this license for any
reason whatsoever OR the abandonment by the Exhibitor
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of the Theatre or his eviction therefrom, the Exhibitor,
at its own cost and expense, shall surrender and deliver up
possession of the equipment to the Company at its factory
... " (Emphasis added). The court also found that "William Littlejohn and E. H. Littlejohn (decedents) abandoned and ceased to operate the Lyric Theatre in the year
1937." (Finding No. 11; J.R. p 45-46). It is clear from
this provision of the agreement that IF plaintiff terminated the contract before its .expiration date, or IF decedents abandoned the theatre,, they (decedents) were to
return the equipment at their own expense. But by abandoning the theatre the decedents could not thereby effect
a termination of the agreement. Apparently the defendants and the trial court take the view that such abandonment did terminate the agreement. The defendants' defense is the bar of the statute of limitations. The statute
would not run against the plaintiff unless a cause of action
accrued. No cause of ·action accrued if the plaintiff did not
tenninate the contract. The plaintiff did not terminate it
as pointed out above, therefore,· defendants' defense hinges
upon the abandonment of the theatre.
If any such construction of the contract is indulged
the plaintiff_ could be deprived of its property by the decedents without due process of law. As an illustration,
suppose that the equipment was very desirable to the decedents. Under defendants' theory they could say to each
other as soon as the equipment was installed, "Let's cease
operating the theatre and the equipment. According to
the agreement we will then be required to return the
equipment to the Company. But, if we refuse to do this,
and just sit by and ignore all demands for its return, the
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Company may not take any action befiore the agreement
expires in 1941. The Company is three thousand miles
away and won't know what is taking place. By 1941, however, action by the company will be too late. Its cause of
action will have arisen immediately upon our abandonment
of the theatre and more than six years will have expired.
Its cause of action will be barred by the statute of limitations and the equipment will be ours." In this way, although plaintiff has a written contract to run for a term
of ten years, it is defeated three of four years before the
end of that term, and its property lost by a ruse that is
locked up in the minds of the. decedents.
Also, such a construction would permit the decedents
to take advantage of their own wrong. The contract was
for ten years. The parties contemplated the operation of
the theatre and the equipment for that term. It was wrong
for the decedents to abandon the theatre and to cease
operating the equipment. It was wrong for them not to
return the equipment when they did abandon it.· And now
their representatives set up those wrongs to defeat plaintiff's action brought within six years from the expiration
date of the contract. In Page on Contracts, Second Edi ..
tion, Vol 5, page 4649 it is stated: "If a condition is inserted in a contract for the benefit of one of the parties,
the adversary party can not take advantage of a breach
thereof." To illustrate the principle the author cites theprovision for acceleration of maturity common in contracts
for the payment of money, and states: "In such case the
debtor can not take advantage of breach of such condition;
and the period of limitations does not begin to run until
the creditor has elected to take advantage of such breach
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
and to treat the maturity of such instrument as accelerated in accordance with the provisions ·of the contract.
(Ibid. p 4650). Lavery et al. v. Mid-Continent Oil Development Co., 162 Pac. 737. The same principles, it is submitted,
apply to the instant case.
Third Assignment of Error
It is submitted that the trial court erred in concluding
"that the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the Statute
of Limitations of the State of Utah and particularly Sections 104-2-24 (2) and 104-2-22 (2) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943."
Section 104-2-24 (2) is the section applicable to actions
for the "taking, detaining or injuring" of personal property.
This section does not apply for the reason that the action
is upon a written instrument. The period of limitatio~s
for actions founded upon written instruments is six years.
104-2-22 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
It is possible that, .if plaintiff had so elected, it had a
cause of action against decedents in the year 1937 for "the
taking, detaining or injury" to the equipment. But this
\vould have be.en an action in tort. Plaintiff was not required to sue at that time, or to elect to terminate the
contract. Certainly, plaintiff was not, and is not, required
to sue in tort when it has a remedy ex contractu. In the
case of Bowes v. Cannon et al., 116 Pac. 336 @ 339, the
court quote with approval the case of Lightfoot v. Davis,
91 NE 582, 584 as follows: '''though a party may have lost
one remedy by lapse of time, it is entirely possible that
others may be open to him.' " Also, in 37 Corpus Juris 699,
the rule is stated as follows: "Where a party has two remeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dies for the enforcement of a right, the one he chooses is
not barred by the statute of limitations, mer~ly because the
other, if he had resorted to it, would have been." Therefore, Section 104-2-24 (2) of the Utah Code Annotate, 1943,
has no application.
Plaintiff's cause of action under the contract did not
accrue until November 19, 1941. The action was commenced May 24, 1945, well within the six-year period of
limitation. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to
conclude that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by
Section 104-2-22 (2) of the Code.
But the judgment should. be rev~rsed for yet another
reason. The contract provides that "Notwithstanding any
termination herein the Company shall be entitled to retain
all sums received by it from the Exhibitor without prejudice to jts right to repossession or to recov.er any additional
sums then or thereafter due to it from the Exhibitor and
to any other rights at law or in equity which the Company
may have hereunder." (Contract, Par. 14; J.R.. p 6). Apparently, the trial court overlooked this provision of the
contract, for, assuming for the purpose of argument only,
that the plaintiff did terminate the agreemen~ more than
six years prior to the commencement of the action, the decedents were still obligated to pay to the plaintiff. the $50
annual license fees "thereafter due it." Conceding t.hat the
six-year period of limitations had run agains~t those annual
license fees which weie due before May 24, 1939 (six years
prior to the commencement of the action), plaintiff is entitled to recover those annual fees which became due after
May 24, 1939. A fee of $50 was due November 19, 1939
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and another \vas due November 19, 1940. Therefore, in any
event, plaintiff is entitled to recover $100 with interest and
costs.
Fourth Assignment of Error
In its argument upon its First Assignmnet of Error
plaintiff points out the error of the trial court in finding
that plaintiff "did not accompany or present with s.aid
claims, or either of them, a copy of the written Agreement
upon which the same was and is founded or based." (Finding No. 14; J.R. p 48). The conclusion drawn by the court
'that the alleged cla_ims presented by the plaintiff to the
defendants are legally insufficient and an action will not
lie thereon" (Conclusions of Law No. 2; J.R. p 48), is based
upon the erroneous finding aforesaid. It therefore follows
that, if the court erred in its finding, the conclusion based
thereon is also erroneous.
If the plaintiff is correct in its position respecting its

Assignments of Error Nos. One, Two, Three and Four, it
follows ·that it must be sustained on its remaining assignments of error.
. CONCLUSIO·N
In conclusion, this court is confronted with a case
where two parties entered. into a written agreement which
expired in N ov~mber, 1941. The one party (plaintiff) fully
performed all its obligations under the agreement; the
other party failed to perform their obligations thereunder,
and then plead that very failure as a defense to and actions
brought within six years from the expiration date of the
agreement.
The judgment for the defendants should be reversed
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and judgment entered in fav()r of the plaintiff for the recovery of the value of the equipment, to wit, $3,000.00
with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum
from May 24, 1945; and for the sum of $100.00 with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from November
19, 1941, together with plaintiff's costs and disbursements
herein expended, both in the trial court and in this court
on appeal.
Respectfully submitt~d,

HAMMOND & HAMMOND,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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In the Supreme Court of
The State of Utah
GENERAL TALKING PICTURES CORP'ORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
NAIDA L. HYATT, as Executrix of the Est5\te of CIVIL
E. H. Littlejohn, who is the same person as Elsie No. 7170
Haas Littlejohn, and JAMES COCHRAN LITTLEJOHN, as administrator with will annexed of
the Estate of William Littlejohn, deceased,
.
Defendants.

CR.espondent' s Brief
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